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V

Ronald Polansky
Duquesne Univ.

Aristotle’s Demarcation of Senses of Energeia
in Metaphysics. IX,6
Aristotle’s distinction between energeia and kinesis has
received renewed interest since Gilbert Ryle employed it in his
discussion of perception. (1) Ryle suggested we misunderstand
perceptual activities, such as seeing and hearing when we consider
them processes or states which have the sorts of causes typical
of those. Instead, he proposed we should follow Aristotle and
recognize, from attention to grammar, that "the verbs ’see’ and
’hear* function like the verb ’win” * or other "verbs of starting
and stopping" (for example, ’find,’ ’begin,’ or ’arrive') rather
than like verbs for processes or states. The response to Ryle's
utilization of Aristotle's distinction between energeia and
kinesis has become a fairly sizable literature.(2} Because there
still seems to be some confusion as to how Aristotle is to be
understood, and because the distinction between energeia and
kinesis plays such a crucial role in many important contexts,(3)
a réévaluation of Aristotle’s concepts seems warranted.
When interpreters have followed Ryle in viewing Aristotle
as distinguishing different sorts of verbs, they have run into
problems. Aristotle’s indication in Meta-physics IX,6 that in
the case of energeiai "we are seeing and have seen, are understan
ding and have understood, are thinking and have thought," whereas
we cannot thus conjoin present and perfect tenses in the case of
kineseis, since we use the perfect tense with them only when they
are complete and terminated, is taken by John Ackrill as
Aristotle’s criterion for distinguishing energeiai and kineseis.(4)
The problem, then, when the ability to conjoin present and perfect
tenses is made the criterion for energeiai. is that many presumed
energeiai fail to meet it, though presumecC kineseis may. Aristotle
seems to want such activities as hearing and enjoying to be
energeiai-, but if we consider the hearing or enjoying of a
symphony, we quickly recognize that it is improper to say I am
hearing or enjoying a ,symphony and I have heard or enjoyed the
symphony. The perfect tense seems proper only when the symphony
is already through, but subsequent to the symphony, of course, we
should not use the present tense about our hearing it or enjoying
it. Conversely, when kineseis are considered without reference
to their ends, for example, walking or building taken apart from
any place to which we walk or any structure arising from the
building, then it seems proper at any moment at which we are
walking or building to say that we have already walked and built.
Hence, these supposed kineseis appear to be energeiai by the
linguistic criterion. (5) In order to overcome this difficulty
for Aristotle’s distinction, some interpreters have proposed that
we not view him as depending upon this linguistic criterion,
but as having another way to grasp the distinction.(6) What I
shall try to contribute to this line of approach is a somewhat
closer treatment of Aristotle's discussion in Metaphysics IX,6
than has been previously attempted and a broader reflection upon
its significance.
Aristotle clearly indicates in Metaphysics IX,6 that energeia
cannot be defined, but that it must be apprehended by induction
from analogy (1048a35-7).(7) We must therefore appreciate the
possibility that Aristotle aims not so much for a precise formula
tion of what energeia is, but the supply of hints to facilitate
our understanding! In the course of presenting the analogy,
Aristotle evidently distinguishes two senses of energeia. He
states, "But all things are not said in the same sense to exist
actually, but only by analogy— as A is in B or to B, Ö is in D or
to D; for some are as movement (kinesis) to potency, and the
others as substance (ousia) to some sort of matter (I048b6-9).M
Aristotle offers little discussion here of these two main kinds
of energeiai. but we may utilize other sections of Metaphysics IX
to fill in the line of thought-to prepare us for the subtler
distinction he goes on to make between kinesis and energeia.
The first sort of energeia noted in the passage is motion.
This most obvious sort of energeia is declared in a previous
section to be the prominent type. Aristotle asserts,
The name ’energeia.' which extends all/the way to complete
reality ( t τήν
νυνγ 1 0€/-(ενη), derives, even in
other cases, especially from motions; for energeia seems
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especially to be motion, on account of which motion is not
attributed to things which are not, though some other predica
tions are, for instance things which are not are thinkable and
desirable, but are not moving, and this is because not being
in actuality they will be in actuality (οΰκ οντ<* év^ayeíf
«σοντ«(ΐ evc^yeía). Por of things which are not some are in
potentiality, but are not since they are not in complete
reality («ντ€λ£χ£ΐ$— 1047a30-b2).(8)
We can certainly conclude that Aristotle believes motion to be
energeia and even the most evident kind.
In this passage he
emphasizes the fact that only things that actually are can undergo
the further actualization involved in moving. Motion is the
actualization of something’s potentiality to be in motion. Hence,
when in the passage in Metaphysics IX,6 Aristotle says that some
energeiai "are as movement to potency (104Sb8)," he has in mind
motion’s correlation with dunanis of the sort he has already
claimed to be the "strictest" type (/u«X(ö*Tec Kij/oioJS— 1045b36),
that is, "a principle of change in another or as other" (1046a
10-1).(9) Motion can be viewed either as the actuality of a
mover* s potentiality to move something, or even better as the
actuality of something’s potentiality to be moved by a mover,
Thus, we appear to have little difficulty appreciating that
motion is an energeia which correlates with the mere potentiality
for such motion.
The other sort of energeia indicated in the passage is "as
substance to some sort of matter" (1048b9).
In order to follow
Aristotle’s intention we must keep in mind that he presents an
analogy.
It is not solely substances which are energeiai
standing over against the matter, but any being in any of the
categories which is energeia as opposed to the substratum in the
privative condition. For example, a white surface or the quality
whiteness is the energeia in relation to the surface which is
potentially white. Aristotle believes that energeia and dunamis
cut across all the categories of being; there are actual and
potential substances, qualities, quantities, relations, times,
places, and so on. This is the very reason energeia resists
definition but is grasped through analogy.
Something surprising emerges from the seemingly unprovocative
observation that energeia and dunamis cut across all the cate
gories. When we get to the categories of action (ttoi€?v ) and
passion (ττάβρχςιν T, it appears that the actuality and potentiality
of these are just the previous sorts of energeiai and dunameis
(see Physics 202a22-4). When, for example, someone is actually
building or the structure is in process of being built, then
there is actual motion, whereas the potentialities to build or
be built are the correlated potentialities. The actuality of an
action or passion is most often motion, and the potentiality of
either of these the dunamis which is the principle of this motion.
Reflecting this way upon how energeia and dunamis pertain to the
various categores of being helps us avoid too facilely thinking
we can easily translate ’energeia’ in some contexts as actuality
but in others as actualization or activity.(10) Sven motion,
even becoming, can be viewed in some sense as being. Yet, though
the analogy of energeia and dunamis spans the entirety of the
categories of being, nonetheless we surely can distinguish
becoming from being. Becoming is confined to the categories of
action and passion that we have focused upon. All change, being
according to Aristotle of four kindst change in substance, quality
quantity, or place, is a process of becoming which terminates
with a new being in one of the categories. The actuality of an .
instance of the categories of action or passion, therefore, is
a process toward another sort of being.(11)
The catégorial approach to energeia and dunamis which we
especially found suggested by Arisioïïe *s use of analogy thus
leads us to recognize that we locate the distinction of two types
of energeiai— *’as movement to a potency" and "as substance to
some sort of matter" (1048b8-9)— within the categories, the latter
extending as widely as the categories themselves and the former
being restricted to actions or passions. Somewhat crudely, we
may say the latter are energeiai in relation to ’being* and the
former energeiai in relation to ’becoming.’ That something like
this path or thought stands behind Aristotle’s presentation in the
main part of Metaphysics IX,6 seems confirmed by the final portion
of the chapter which lays out the crucial distinction between

3
energeiai and kineseis (ΙΟ^δ^Ιδ ff. ) .T
ï
j
l
s
.abruptly.,
unless we allow that when Bristol;!©, starts off distinguishing two
kinds of praxeis (in 1048bl8) that -praxis is here meant to refer
to the whole category of action. (12) Then Aristotle is making a
subtle distinction within this category. Though many actual
actions are motions which terminate in a new actual category of
being (for example, the action of building terminates in a house),
still others do not seem analogously to be processes. For example,
seeing, thinking, choosing, seem definitely to be instances of
the category of action, along with building, hitting, heating,
but unlike them not to be processes resulting in a being of
another category. The thrust of Aristotle*s discussion of the
distinction of energeia and kinesis is that though the energeiai
resemble kineseis categorially, nevertheless they are different
in a vital respect from them, thereby resembling the other sort
of energeiai. We thus seem to have energeiai straddling the
principal division between kinds of energeiai.
Let us trace what Aristotle says in the final section of
Metaphysics IS.6 and then explore what he must be thinking. He
indicates that some actions have' a limit (peras) toward which
they proceed, not having their end (teles). prior to reaching
this limit, whereas others always have tiieir end in'themselves
(1048bl8-23). It is in clarification of this point that
Aristotle introduces the conjunction of present and perfect
tenses. He gives examples of actions which we readily
acknowledge we simultaneously do and have done, and other cases
in which we must deny this. He states, "E.g. at the same time we
are seeing and have seen, are understanding and have understood,
are thinking and have thought (while it is not true that at the
same time we are,learning and have learnt, or a being cured and
have been cured.)** (1048b23-5). The fact that we can conjoin the
perfect with the present in some cases means there is completeness
throughout the duration of these actions and hence that their end
is not an external limit toward which they head, but always
within them.(13) It must be emphasized that Aristotle*s obvious
purpose in referring to the conjunction of present and perfect
tenses is to support the view that some actions are always
complete, have their end, whereas others are not. Nothing he
says suggests he is devising a criterion for identifying cases
nor commenting upon peculiar features of the use of language.
Rather, his focus is exclusively upon the two kinds of actions
under consideration.
The only further point made in this section is closely con
nected and confirms the line I have taken. Aristotle says,
At the same time we are living well and have lived well, and
are happy and have been happy.
If not, the process would
have had sometime to cease, as the process of making thin
ceases: but, as things are, it does not ceasej we are living
and have lived (1048b25-7).
The argument here is that if energeiai were not always having
their end within them and being complete, then they would have
to cease sometime as kineseis generally must.(14) Aristotle
expects us to recognize that kineseis do cease when they reach
their limit, whereas some sorts of actions, such as living well,
never must thus cease, though of course they may cease sometime.
Since it is not the case that these energeiai must ever necessarily
stop at some determinate moment, they must always have their end
in themselves and be complete. Unless these energeiai were always
complete, they would be moving toward some limit reaching which
they could no t continue in the form they had had up .until, then.
Aristotle feels it adequate for his purposes in this chapter
simply to leave it at emphasizing that energeiai have their end
within them and are complete, whereas kineseis, having an external
limit, are never complete so long as they remain kineseis, but
only upon attaining their limit and ceasing the motion. Further
clarity about Aristotle's thought depends upon our drawing
inferences from the material he succinctly provides us here. Let
us proceed to develop this comprehensive understanding of
Aristotle*s contrast between energeiai and kineseis in order that
we may grasp how to conceive the completeness of energeiai and
hence overcome any confusion about them.
When we recall that Aristotle began in 1048bl8 by referring
to actions (praxeis), we may realize that energeiai are
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restricted to a certain domain. When.we consider the examples
he provides of energeiai, we find that that domain is rather
narrow.(15) He often presents as energeiai cognitive activities,
such as seeing, hearing, thinking, or more generally perception
and intellection. He further illustrates energeiai with affective
activities, such as enjoying, fearing, desiring. Finally, he
looks toward the synthesis of ¡cognition and affectivity in choice
(proairesis), action (praxis) , living well, and being happy as
another sort of energeia. We may hence conclude that energeiai
extend only to the actions and passions of animals, and more
precisely to their thought, perception, emotion, desire, or
choice.(16)
Confirmation of this restriction of energeiai to the cog
nitive and affective life of animals comes indirectly from a
passage in a subsequent chapter. In the midst of showing the
priority of actuality to potentiality in IX,8, Aristotle states,
Where, then, the result is something apart from the exercise
ton*' v), the actuality (evc/oygja) is in the thing that is
being made, e.g. the act of building is in the thing that is
being built and that of weaving in the thing that is being
woven, and similarly in all other cases, and in general the
movement (KÍvr\Cus ) is in the thing that is being moved; but
where there is no product
apart from the actuality
(ev^oy€1«^, the actuality (eve/ycra) is present in the agents,
e.g. the act of seeing is in the seeing subject and that of
theorizing in the theorizing subject and the life is in the
soul (and therefore well-being also; for it is a certain kind
of life). (1050a30-b2)
It is clear from this passage not only that the distinction
between energeia and kinesis is based principally, as I have
emphasized, upon whether the end is external or internal, but
also that energeiai are all in the souls of animals, whereas
kineseis may be in whatever is being moved by something. If
energeiii were to be in what they were somehow effecting, then
•fekey could not have their ends in themselves. Only certain
psychical actions; of the cognitive, affective, and practical
sorts we have been discussing, qualify as energeiai because with
them the end is the very action "itself.
Once the true range of energeiai has been discerned diffi
culties surrounding them disappear.
Initially, we avoid concern
about many verbs that seem to name energeiai when there is
thought to be a linguistic criterion for them. If we just con
sider the possibility of conjoining present and perfect tenses,
then verbs s u c h a s *being,* ’living,’ ’starting,’ ’stopping,’ and
’walking' seem to name energeiai. But, having delimited the range
of energeiai. we can generally dismiss these.
'Being* fails in
many cases to be an action (praxis) at all and so is not in our
sense an energeia, though it is perfectly proper to say, for
example, ii is and has been green.
'Living' only names an
energeia when we are speaking of animal life, the life of percep
tion and intellection. Plants live, too, but do not have
energeiai in our sense because their life is merely kinesis, such
as growth and reproduction.
’Starting' or ’stopping,' when it is
a kinesis that is doing so, could hardly be energeia. Finally,
'walking, * whether we are thinking of walking without regard to
an intended place or a walk to some definite place or aimless
walking (if there is really ever such walking), could never be
an energeia.
Any remaining uneasiness about Aristotle's distinction
between energeia and kinesis can only be alleviated by further
reflection upon what is entailed in giving energeiai this narrow
range. The outstanding obstacles for Aristotle’s distinction
are these two. First, kineseis, when we ignore their ends, seem
complete throughout the course of their duration. For example,
at any moment once we have started to move it seems true to say
we have moved, even though we have not reached our ultimate
destination. Thus it might appear that motions could have their
ends within themselves. Second, when an energeia has for its
object not something instantaneous, such as a small color patch
or a single note, but an object having temporal duration and even
a kinesis, such as a musical performance or a horse race, then it
seems no more complete at every moment than its object. Hence an
energeia might have its end outside itself. Let us see if we can
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remove these obstacles by showing how energeiai, as psychical,
activities, have a relationship with ..their 'ends ...different from
those which kineseis have with their ends.
With regard to the first matter, the completeness of kineseis
when we consider them apart from their ends, we may exhibit how
different this is from the completeness of an energeia. Every
kinesis is a process through time in which we achieve more and
more of the end until the process arrives at completion. Until
the end is attained there are merely partial realizations. This
is stated well in Nicomachean Ethics X,4.ir74al9-23.
For every movement (kinesi s )(,e.gT that of building) takes time
and is for the sake of an end, and is complete when it has
made what it aims at. It is complete, therefore, only in the
whole time or at that final moment. In their parts and during
the time they occupy, all movements are incomplete, and are
different in kind from the whole movement and from each other.
Since kineseis are thus not truly complete except "in the whole
time or at tiiät final moment," if we speak of them in the perfect
tense while they are still in process it must be merely retro
spectively. When we claim, after we start moving, that we have
moved, this only means we have accomplished some parts of our
process of moving. For example, during the course of a long
walk or a project of building we have already walked or built
so far or so much as we have walked or built. But when we use
the perfect tense in the case of energeiai, psychical activities,
we are not using it retrospectively ox those parts of the activi
ties which have already been accomplished. Energeiai. not being
processes which take time or which could ever be merely partially
realized, always have the ends in themselves and are always com
plete. The perfect tense, in their case, has no reference to the
past, it rather refers to the completeness in this very moment
of the energeia.(17) Since energeiai are wholly complete in
every momenx and never only partially complete, at the very first
instant of their onset it would be proper to use the perfect
tense, whereas with kineseis the perfect might only be used some
time after they begin. |lö)·
Having thus removed the obstacle about kineseis considered
apart from their ends by showing their deficient mode of com
pleteness, we must now examine the effects on energeiai of having
objects with temporal durations. How, when their, objects are in
motion or taking time, could energeiai be complete at every
moment? Aristotle is evidently unperturbed by the possibility of
energeiai with temporally extended objects. He states in
Mcom a c H ian Ethics X.4«1174al4-9.
Seeing seems to be at any moment complete, for it does not lack
anything which coming into being later will complete its form;
and pleasure also seems to be of this nature. For it is a
whole, and at no time can one find a pleasure whose form will
be completed if the pleasure lasts longer.
Why Aristotle is so confident about energeiai being complete at
every moment is that he attributes to them the sort of indivisi
bility and simplicity of a mathematical point or unit. He
declares in Nicomachean Ethics 1174b9-14,
From these considerations it is clear, too, that these thinkers
are not right in saying there is a movement or a coming into
being of pleasure. For these cannot be ascribed to all things,
but only to those that are divisible and not wholes; there is
no coming into being of seeing nor of a point nor of a unit,
nor is any of these a movement or coming into being; therefore
there is no movement or coming into being of pleasure either;
for- it is a whole, (19)
We need to examine how energeiai are complete in form at every
moment and have no coming into being due to their being as
indivisible as points or units.
In Metaphysics VII,8 it is argued that in a process of change
neither the form nor the matter comes to be, but only the com
posite of form and matter has genesis. In particular, the form
cannot come to be since where there is no divisibility there can
be no coming into being (1033bll-9). Now Aristotle has indicated
quite clearly that he believes energeiai are as indivisible and
complete as units or points and so not involved in any becoming. (20)
The foundation of this belief lies in his understanding of cogni
tion. If every energeia is either cognition or closely connected
with it, as we have emphasized, and each cognitive act, whether
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NOTES
(1)

G. Ryle, Dilemmas (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1954), 102-6.

(2)

R.J. Hirst early questioned Ryle’s understanding of Aristotle in
The Problem of Perception (New York: Macmillan, 1959), 126-35. He
contended Ryle confuses ’end’ in the sense of ’goal* with 'terminus*
and consequently falsely saddles Aristotle with limiting energeiai
to instants, whereas, in fact, Aristotle insists energeiai are
continuable and may last a long time. John Ackriil in "Aristotle's
Distinction Between Energeia and Kinesis," in New Essays on Plato
and Aristotle, ed. by R. Bambrougii (New York: Humanities, 1965),
121-41, accepted Hirst's criticism but went on to find difficulties
in Aristotle's own conceptions, which will be discussed below.
Ackriil*s article has provoked renewed examination of Aristotle.
The literature referring to Ackriil's piece includes: X.M. Crombie,
review of New Essays on Plato and Aristotle, in Classical Review
N.S. 17(19¿>7), 32; W.P.R. Hardie, Aristotle's Ethical Theory
(Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 1968), 305; M.&L Mulhern, *'Types of
Process According to Aristotle," Monist 52(1968), 237-51, T. Penner,
"Verbs and the Identity of Actions," in Ryle, ed. by O.P. Wood, and
G. Pitcher (London: Macmillan, 1970), 393-453; P.S. Mamo, "Energeia '
and Kinesis, in Metaphysics Θ.6." Apeiron 4(1970), 24-34; W.ST
Hoffman, ^Aristotle's Logic of Verb Tenses," Journal of Critical
Analysis 6(1976), 89-95; F.R. Pickering, "Aristotle on Walking,"
Arcnlv für Geschichte der Philosophie 59(1977), 37-43.

(3)

Aristotle's metaphysics, psychology, ethics, and politics depend
upon this distinction.
See, e.g., De Anima 11,5 and III,7; Nie.
Ethics VI,4-5 and K,4: Metaphysics XII,9.

(4)

Ackriil follows Ryle in viewing Aristotle as distinguishing classes
of verbs. But in making the conjunction of present and perfect
tenses the criterion for energeiai, he may take the lead from W.D.
Ross, who said, "the test of an energeia as against a kinesis...we
that we -are doing it and have done it at the same time," in
Aristotle's Metaphysics: A Revised Text with Introduction and Com
mentary, Vol. IX~(Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 19241, 2 5 1 , n. 1046b8.
Por the 'tense test* see also: Zeno Vendíer, "Verbs and Times,"
Philosophical Revigw (1957), 143-60 and Anthony Kenny, Action.
Emotion-and Will (,London: Routledge, 1963), Chapter 8.

(5)
(6)

Ackriil, pp. 131-5.
See, e.g., Mamo, p. 27.

(7)

Ross, p, 251, n. 1048a36, correctly observes that since energeia,
like being, unity, and good, applies universally, it does not fit
within a single genus and so is not definable by genus and difference.

(8)

Cf. Meta. 1050a21-3.

I have used the Oxford translations.

(9)

Cf. A. Peck, "Aristotle on Kivr\<Ti.r," in Essays in Greek Philosophy,
ed. by J.P. Anton and G. Kustas (Albany: SUNY Press, 1971), p. 479,
and Ross, p. 349, n. 1069a22.
(10) Chung-Hwan Chen perhaps should not distinguish between "quasi-modal"
and "non-modal" senses of energeia and dunamis, in "Different
Meanings of the Term Energeia in the Philosophy of Aristotle,"
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 17(1956-7), 56-65. He
says moving or functioning is a non-modal sense of energeia,
translatable as 'actualization' or 'actualizing,* whereas cases
in which we speak of actuality versus potentiality are quasimodal, since these are "ways of existence" (Chen, p. 57, refers
to 1048a30-2).
See on this L.A. Kosman, "Aristotle's Definition
of Motion," Phronesis 14(19691. 40-62.
(11) My catégorial approach toward energeia and dunamis seems confirmed
by Meta. 1048b9-17 and such a passage as: "Further, matter exists
in a potential state, just because it may come to its form; and
when it exists actually, then it is in its form. And the same
holds good in all cases, even those in which the end is a move
ment (1050al5-7, my italics)."
(12) A difficulty might be raised about whether Aristotle would speak
of non-animals as engaged in praxeis. Though he normally would not,
I believe we must here allow a broad sense to the term. W.D. Ross
suggests,
is first used in a general sense=Kivr\giy, then in
its stricter sense of Kivr\<nj· τ€λ€»« (p. 253, n. 1048bl8-2l)."
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(13; Aristotle does not. here quite say that energeiai always have -their
ends, and hence Ackrill has toyed with the possibility that he does
not mean the present always to "entail the perfect” (pp. 123 ff.).
The context, however, makes it clear we may add the "always." We
should note the of*v in 1048b28 suggests we are considering actions
throughout their duration. I return to this point below.
(14) Locomotion in a circle is the only exception.
(15) Only Mamo seems to have noted the extent of energeiai; he says, "It
is not, of course, accidental that all the energeiaimentioned by
Aristotle are mental processes (p. 32)." Mamo does not push this
point as far as he might have.
(16) That energeiai must link up with perceptive and intellective life
makes it fitting, as we previously noted, that they straddle the
main division of energeiai into those pertaining to ’becoming* and
those to ’being.*
Since cognition is by ’like to like’ and it
must apprehend all things, it should be like or become like to all.
(17) Ackrill misunderstands the present perfect tense. He suggests,
"the ’has heard* can be taken to refer to a period of time pre
ceding the moment to which the ’hears* refers (p. 126)." This is
to confuse ’has been hearing* with ’has heard.’ In the case of
energeiai. the perfect tense conjoined with the present refers to
the completeness in this present moment, but not to a stretch of
activity prior to the present, as it does with kineseis. Ryle had
a better sense of this than Ackrill. I am indebted here to a
paper by Thomas Bartlett.
(18) This point underlies Nie. Ethics 1174al4-9 and b3-9.
(19) This likening of cognitive activity to a unit or point is not
unique in the corpus.
See De Anima 427al0-3 and De Sensu 449316-20.
(20) In De Sensu VI.446b2-4, Aristotle says, "acts of sense-perception
do not involve a process of becoming, but have their being none
the less without involving such a process."
(21) For an illuminating discussion of this doctrine, see Joseph Owens*
"Form and Cognition in Aristotle," Ancient Philosophy 1(1980), 17-27.·
(22) This may be taken to be the central meaning of the difficult pas
sage De Anima III,6,430bl4-20. The view that psychical energeiai
are directed to the whole matter for thought credits all animals
wj,th some of the ability Xenophanes claimed for god when he said?
©ύλο$ oya«, oSAoi Sè voeî , oùXÔS &€ t ^ k o u c i (Fr. 24).

